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Abstract 
By changing the level of competition and/or affecting the allocation of resources, 
institutions can play a very important role on innovation activity. In this paper we 
investigate the relative importance of institutional variation across European 
countries in explaining differences in their innovation intensity at the industry level. 
We employ a novel indicator of innovation therefore circumventing the limitations of 
more traditional indicators. Our results are broadly consistent with previous 
empirical literature. They show that stringent product and labor market regulation 
affects innovation intensity negatively, and that more developed credit markets foster 
innovation. However, the empirical findings also raise doubts with respect to the 
strengthening of intellectual property rights as a means to stimulate innovation, a 
result that is in accordance with recent propositions in the literature. 
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1. Introduction 
There has been a recent growing interest on the importance of institutions as a means 
to explain various economic phenomena1. The role of institutions in determining 
technological change and cross-country differences in innovation activity has also 
become the focus of some recent literature.  
Contributions from the innovation systems literature have repeatedly proposed 
that key technologies need supporting institutions that may be different over time. 
Accordingly, the countries that will succeed are those that already have in place the 
basis of these institutions when they are needed (Freeman, 1987; Dosi et al., 1988, 
Lundvall, 1992; Nelson, 1988). In these studies, institutions are mainly concrete entities 
related to the production or diffusion of innovation as universities, research institutes, 
prevailing patent law, public programs or technical societies (Nelson, 2008). More 
recently attention has focused on institutions related to political and educational 
aspects, product and labor markets regulation, and intellectual property rights (see the 
evidence in Menezes-Filho et al. (1998), Bassanini and Ernst (2002), Varsakelis (2006), 
Samaniego (2006), Griffith et al. (2006a), Kanwar (2007)).  
Besides institutions, previous empirical evidence on the determinants of 
innovation intensity across countries has shown that differences in national innovation 
systems (e.g. public investment in R&D and education) as well as industry-specific 
characteristics largely explain differences in innovation across countries (Furman et al., 
2002). Mathieu and Potterie (2008) explored this issue by investigating to what extent 
differences in innovation performance are more driven by structural factors, such as 
technological specialization, than by intrinsic national policies. Their results suggest 
that taking into account the technological specialization of countries drastically reduces 
the observed macroeconomic differences in relative R&D efforts.  
Other works exploring the drivers of innovation activities corroborate the view 
that emphasizes the importance of industry-specific characteristics for the 
                                                     
1 See, inter alia, Djankov et al. (2002) and Desai et al. (2003) on the impact of institutions on 
entrepreneurial activity and firm dynamics, Alesina et al. (2005) on investment, Griffith et al. 
(2007) on unemployment, and Matschke (2010) on trade. 
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development and diffusion of new technologies (e.g. Breschi et al., 2000; Fagerberg, 
2002; Braguinsky et al., 2007; Dinlersoz and MacDonald, 2009, Samaniego, 2006)2. They 
found that much of the firm’s innovative behavior depends on the response of firms to 
deeper industry parameters, such as the industries’ technological opportunities, 
appropriation methods, the stages of the industry life-cycle, and the innovation itself. 
In this paper we integrate these literatures, combining industry and country level 
perspectives, in order to understand cross-country differences in innovation at 
industry level and the role of institutional environment on innovation activities. In 
particular, we focus on three types of country-level market regulation, namely product, 
labor and financial markets regulation, as well as on the stringency of intellectual 
property rights and explore their relationship with industries’ innovation intensity. 
This study contributes to our understanding of the institutional context of 
technological change in the following ways. First, it provides new empirical evidence 
on the role institutions play on innovation by using a richer set of institutional 
indicators and an alternative indicator of innovation. Second, it focuses the analysis on 
European Union (EU) countries. Several recent studies have investigated the role of 
regulatory practices across EU countries, yet very few analyze their impact on 
innovation. The focus on EU countries is also motivated by the two landmarks of 
institutional reform in the EU, the Single Market Program and the Lisbon Strategy 
whose underlying belief is that more competition and less regulation should bolster 
innovation and thus productivity and growth.  
Third, conversely to previous works, we address the issue of potential 
endogeneity in the relationship between institutions and innovation. As innovation 
leads to changes in both product and factor markets by changing its structure and 
shifting demand, we can expect that innovation may also determine institutions in 
particular those that are aimed to regulate those markets. By explicitly addressing 
                                                     
2 The literature on sectoral systems of innovation (Breschi et al., 2000) has shown that the 
sources and opportunities for progress are specific in individual industries. Consequently, 
innovation activity is characterized by different patterns that are driven by technological 
regimes, i.e., some essential features of the knowledge base and the prevailing learning 
conditions within an industry. 
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causality, our findings are a step ahead in assessing the relationship between 
institutions and innovation. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 discusses the ways in 
which some institutions can affect innovation. Section 3 describes our data, the 
institutional context in the EU and presents the empirical model. Section 4 proposes the 
econometric approach and discusses the empirical results. Section 5 concludes our 
study. 
2. Institutions and innovation 
The term “institutions” has been used in the literature to represent different aspects of 
economic, legal, political, and social activity, making it difficult to arrive at a single 
definition. In the seminal contribution North (1990) defines institutions as the rules of 
the game in a society. This approach to institutions has been followed by other authors. 
Hwang and Powell (2005) view institutional change as the rule-making, or the creation 
of formal laws, that defines the playing field, enabling the efforts of certain groups and 
retarding the efforts of others. In turn, Nelson (2008) views institutions as a device to 
explain “prevalent methods of doing things in contexts where actions and interactions 
of several parties determine what is achieved” (p. 2). 
In this paper we follow this perspective on institutions and focus our attention on 
administrative and economic practices and policies aimed at regulating the product, 
labor, and capital markets, as well the intellectual property systems. While these 
aspects of regulation do not completely cover all institutional dimensions, they include 
some of the most important structures and forces that shape and maintain the 
institutional environment affecting innovation activities. 
Product market regulation and innovation 
Existing theories of regulation present different predictions relating the impact of these 
costs on economic activity and who benefits from regulation. The public interest theory 
holds that regulation is needed to correct market failures and protect the public 
interest. On the other hand, the public choice theory sees regulation as a means by 
which large incumbent firms seek to maintain their rents (Stigler, 1971). As such, 
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stronger regulation means less competition, and higher market power for incumbents, 
impeding the ability of new entrants to innovate. 
Anti-trust policy is one of the dimensions of product market regulation commonly 
believed to exercise the most influence on innovation as it is aimed at reducing market 
power and market concentration. Although it has been widely recognized that the level 
of competition is one of the main determinants of innovation, economic theory 
presents conflicting perspectives. According to Schumpeter (1942) more competition 
reduces firms’ incentives to innovate as the monopolistic rents resulting from 
innovation come to be eroded. Twenty years later, Arrow (1962) argued that firms in a 
more competitive market have greater incentives to innovate than those in a 
monopolistic one due to the profits replacement effect, i.e., the difference between post-
innovation and pre-innovation profits.3 
The possibility of an inverted-U relationship between competition and innovation 
was the first noted by Scherer (1967) and it has been explored more recently by some 
endogenous growth models (Aghion et al., 2005) and R&D race models (e.g. Boone, 
2001; Dubey and Wu, 2002; Dinlersoz and MacDonald, 2009). These models predict 
that both effects are possible, i.e., that a non-monotone relation between intensity of 
competition and innovation is possible. 
In particular, Aghion et al. (2005) argue that more competition may foster 
innovation in industries where incumbent firms are operating at similar technological 
levels. In this in case, R&D investments aim at “escaping competition”. On the other 
hand, in industries where innovation is made by laggard firms with already low initial 
profits, an increase in competition may erode post-innovation profits, thus 
discouraging innovation. Other works (e.g. Boone, 2001; Dubey and Wu, 2002; 
Dinlersoz and MacDonald, 2009; D'Aspremont et al., 2010) suggest that the incentives 
to innovation will ultimately depend upon innovation- and industry-specific 
characteristics, namely technological level and technological regime of the industry. 
                                                     
3 Subsequent models of product differentiation and monopolistic competition (Salop, 1977; Dixit 
and Stiglitz, 1977) and some R&D or patent race models (e.g. Gilbert and Newbery, 1982) 
predict that more intense product market competition discourages innovation by reducing post 
entry rents, but some R&D or patent race models (e.g. Reiganum, 1983) provide opposite 
results.  
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Thus increasing competition as a means to stimulate innovation requires a detailed 
analysis of the industry at hand. 
Besides the direct impact on competition, stricter anti-trust laws can also lead to a 
smaller average firm size (Kumar et al., 1999). In this case, it could be argued that 
stricter anti-trust laws could have a negative impact on innovation because firm size is 
usually positively correlated with innovation. Yet, evidence shows that this may not be 
always the case since small firms tend to outperform large firms when using 
innovation counts as an indicator for innovation (Kleinknecht et al., 2002). 
Another important aspect of product market regulation is entry regulation, of 
which start-up costs are a relevant component. High start-up costs can act as a barrier 
to entry making it difficult for entrepreneurs to start a new business, thereby hindering 
the introduction of innovations. Antunes and Cavalcanti (2007) argue that high start-
up costs may also increase the size of the shadow economy, thus they would impact 
negatively on innovation as firms in the shadow economy have greater difficulty in 
securing credit and attracting highly skilled labor and investments in innovation. 
Although several studies analyze the impact of product market regulation on 
productivity, only two studies (Griffith et al., 2006a; Amable et al., 2010) provide 
empirical evidence of the impact of product market regulation on innovation. The 
work by Griffith et al. (2006a) suggests that the reforms carried out under the EU Single 
Market Program (SMP) reduced the average level of profitability, and that this had a 
positive impact on innovative activity which in turn affected total factor productivity 
growth. Yet, they also reported a negative impact of deregulation on R&D and 
productivity in the high-tech public procurement market industries. On the other hand 
Amable et al. (2010) present evidence contradicting the belief in the innovation-
boosting effect of product market deregulation, even in industries close to the frontier 
as predicted by Aghion et al. (2005).  
Labor market regulation and innovation 
Labor market regulation can assume various forms such as legislation regulating hiring 
and firing practices, wages, and unemployment insurance. Among labor market 
regulatory practices, employment protection legislation (EPL) has been identified as 
most influencing innovation. However opposite theoretical effects can be anticipated 
from employment rigidity and empirical evidence has thus far been inconclusive. 
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On the one hand, the rigid regulation of hiring and firing may increase the 
bargaining power of unions, making it more difficult for the firm to invest in R&D and 
to adjust wages after an innovation has occurred. The argument is based on the view 
that the union wage mark-up is financed from appropriating the quasi-rents earned on 
capital. This acts as a tax which will raise the sunk costs of investment and therefore 
reduce the amounts that firms are willing to invest. This is particularly a problem for 
intangible investments such as R&D because it is highly risky, has long gestation lags 
and is largely irreversible (Menezes-Filho et al, 1998). Unions and stringent dismissal 
laws can also make it more difficult for firms to adapt to new technologies that require 
the reallocation of staff or downsizing. 
More stringent labor market regulation can also hinder innovation if wages are 
sufficiently high as they create incentives to develop and adopt labor saving capital 
intensive technologies at the low end of the skill distribution (Alesina and Zeira, 2006). 
Samaniego (2006, 2008) proposes that firing costs are particularly detrimental to profits 
in industries in which the rate of technical change is rapid, such as ICT, and countries 
with high firing costs specialize in industries in which technical change is sluggish. 
Gust and Marquez’s (2004) results support the view that burdensome regulatory 
environments and, in particular, regulations affecting labor market practices have 
impeded the adoption of information technologies in a number of industrial countries. 
On the other hand, others (Acharya et al., 2010) have argued that unions and/or 
stringent dismissal laws may encourage greater training, and incentive employers to 
invest in training and thereby increase employees’ productivity and motivation to 
engage in more successful, and more significant, innovative pursuits. Acemoglu (1997) 
argues that stronger EPL decreases the need to maximize current wages, as an 
employee can look forward to job security and future higher wages. 
Menezes-Filho et al. (1998) found that union density has at first a positive effect on 
a firm’s relative R&D performance. The effects of union power were only negative 
when the union density was very high and/or the union bargained only over wages. 
Koeniger (2005) and Acharya et al. (2010) found that stronger dismissal laws lead to 
more investment in R&D and more innovation at industry level. Furthermore Acharya 
et al. (2010) found that stronger dismissal laws lead to relatively more innovation in the 
innovation-intensive industries than in the traditional industries.  
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In turn, Bassinini and Ernst (2002) found that the impact of employment protection 
policies on innovation depends on the state of industrial relations (e.g. bargaining 
arrangements, business associations, business codes of conduct, etc.) and on the 
industry’s level of technology. Overall, their results suggest that strict employment 
protection policies are likely to negatively affect R&D intensity, especially in the high-
tech industries of countries where industrial relation systems are relatively 
decentralized. These differences may reflect the way in which the innovation process 
across industries and the state of industrial relations affect firms' efforts to satisfy the 
need for skilled labor to cope with innovation. 
Recently Griffith and Macartney (2010) found that multinational enterprises locate 
more innovative activity in countries with high EPL. However they locate more 
technologically advanced innovation in countries with low EPL. They interpret their 
results as corroborating evidence for both opposite effects as advanced in the 
theoretical literature. 
Capital market regulation and innovation 
Financial development may affect innovation activity either directly or through 
indirect mechanisms. To begin with, and starting by the latter, financial development 
may affect the innovation intensity in a given industry through two main mechanisms: 
the firm size distribution and the industry’s dynamics and competition level. Various 
studies have found that financial development fosters entry of firms in the industry 
and leads to a more competitive environment (see, e.g., evidence in Rajan and Zingales 
(1998), Kumar et al., 1999; Guiso et al. (2004), and Macchiavello (in press)). We will 
come back to this topic further below since this result is particularly relevant in the 
case of technology-based start-ups. 
Financial constraints have also been found as one of the major reasons that prevent 
new firms from attaining their optimal initial size (Cabral and Mata, 2003). As such, 
credit availability is an important determinant of firm growth and survival (e.g. Guiso 
et al., 2004; Clementi and Hopenhayn, 2006). We can expect that firms that have 
attained their optimal size are in better position to engage in innovation investment. 
This idea is corroborated by Davis and Henrekson (1997) who argue that regulations 
restricting capital access favor larger, established firms over smaller entrants.  
Also financial development may reduce vertical integration of larger firms and 
lead smaller, non-integrated, firms to exit the industry (Macchiavello, in press). As a 
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result, higher financial development reduces vertical integration in industries where a 
high share of output is produced by small firms. The positive effect of financial 
development on entry also reduces vertical integration by fostering the development of 
input markets. This evidence is consistent with the development of technology markets 
and the appearance of new technology-based firms that produce intermediate inputs 
for large established firms. 
One important channel through which financial development may influence 
innovation intensity directly is by the financing of technology-based start-ups or high-
tech investment. This is so because the returns from high-tech investment are highly 
uncertain and because information asymmetries are also likely to exist between firms 
and potential investors. Moreover high-tech investments often have very little 
collateral value because most R&D investment is devoted primarily to salary 
payments, which have little salvage value in the event of failure (Carpenter and 
Petersen, 2002).  
Recent increasing empirical findings show a positive impact of credit availability 
on both the creation of technology-based firms and on firms’ innovation effort (e.g. 
Bottazzi and Da Rin, 2002; Cassar, 2004; Audrestch and Elston, 2006). However, some 
studies did not find similar effect on the growth of these start-ups (e.g. Cressy, 1996; 
Bottazzi and Da Rin, 2002). 
Overall empirical findings on the impact of financial credit on innovation suggest 
a positive and significant effect. In particular, evidence shows that venture capital 
favors the entry of new firms and/or small firms, particularly technology based start-
ups. So, we can expect that financial development will have a positive and larger effect 
in industries with high innovation intensity where small firms can enter and compete 
(e.g. software, biotechnology).  
On the other hand, some credit regulations may be more favorable to incumbent 
firms, enabling them to grow, and, possibly, increase concentration. In this case, the 
expected impact of financial credit on innovation intensity at industry level will 
depend whether innovation is mostly done by incumbents or new firms. 
Intellectual property rights and innovation 
It is widely recognized that the incentives to work, produce, invest or innovate depend 
crucially on the quality of institutions in general, and the degree of protection of 
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property rights in particular. The underlying idea is that the less secure are the 
property rights, the weaker these incentives, which would impact negatively on 
economic outcomes (Angelopoulos et al., 2010). 
Intellectual property rights (henceforth, IPRs), and patents in particular, have two 
aims to provide incentives to research and to disclose information, but at the social 
costs of reducing the invention’s use during the patent life. The main argument in 
favor of patents is that they encourage ex ante innovation by creating ex post monopoly 
rents (e.g. Romer, 1990; Aghion and Howitt, 1992; Economides et al., 2007; Eicher and 
Garci-Peñalosa, 2008). 
IPRs may also induce innovation through other mechanisms.4 First, secure 
property rights facilitate international technology transfer and diffusion through 
foreign direct investment and trade (Helpman, 1993; Coe et al., 2008) 5. Second, IPRs 
contribute to the functioning of technology markets (Arora et al., 2001). Third, IPRs 
may facilitate start-ups in some circumstances by giving an inventor the time to get 
established in the industry. Fourth, IPRs may also facilitate capital investment, since 
venture capitalists often look at IPRs portfolios in deciding whether to invest in a new 
company (Lemley, 2009). 
The view that strong IPRs, and patents in particular, are necessary to stimulate 
innovation has been challenged by the literature on the optimal design of patents that 
is rooted in the idea of cumulative or sequential innovation, whereby new innovations 
produce the ideas for future innovations (Horwitz and Lai, 1996; Hopenhayn et al., 
2006). In contrast, these studies predict that the relationship between patents and 
innovation may be nonmonotonic, depending on the relative effects of innovators 
being both leaders and followers and on the ease with which they can transfer their 
technologies (Gallini, 1992). 
Empirical evidence seems to support the view of new theoretical models and 
raises doubts with respect to the efficacy of patents to stimulate innovation. Hall (2007) 
reviews recent studies and observes two empirical regularities. First, the strengthening 
                                                     
4 See Besley and Batak (2010) for a detailed discussion of some of these mechanisms. 
5 IPRs may also affect international technology diffusion between developed and developing 
countries. Since our focus is on the EU countries we do not review this literature here. 
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of a patent system6 unambiguously results in an increase in patenting and also in the 
use of patents as a tool in most firms’ business strategies. Second, an increase in 
innovation due to patents is likely to be concentrated in specific industries, namely 
pharmaceutical, biotechnology, medical instrument industries, and possibly specialty 
chemicals (see, e.g, Hall (2007), Qian (2007), Arora et al. (2008)). 
Also Boldrin and Levine (2008) argue and provide extensive data and facts in 
order to build a case against IPRs and to what they call an “intellectual monopoly”. 
Their point is that the monopoly effect brings more harm than benefit to the collective 
well-being and that the strengthening of the intellectual property system does not 
bring more innovation. 
Indeed, these results just confirm those obtained by Levin et al. (1987) and Cohen 
et al. (2000) that patents are highly industry-specific and they are not the firm’s 
preferred method of protection against imitation (trade secrets and first-mover 
advantages rank first in firms’ preferences). Patents efficacy as a protection method 
depends on the type of knowledge (tacit or codified) and the innovation type (product 
or process). This will partly determine appropriability, i.e., the ability of the creator to 
capture rents sufficient to pay back the fixed cost investment of creation.  
An important conclusion from these studies is that IPRs work differently in 
different industries. Whereas innovators in the information and technology industries 
tend to use patents defensively, to protect themselves against suit, rather than relying 
on exclusivity and affirmative enforcement of IP rights. By contrast, the 
pharmaceutical, biotechnology, and medical devices industries depend critically on the 
enforcement of patents to obtain at least partial market exclusivity (see, e.g., Boldrin 
and Levine, 2008; Lemley, 2009). 
                                                     
6 That is, lengthening the patent term, broadening subject matter coverage or available scope, 
and improving enforcement. 
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3. Data, empirical model and variables 
Data 
Our data is derived from different sources. Our main data source is the Fourth 
Community Innovation Survey (CIS4) which covers the years from 2002 to 2004 and 
includes most EU countries. The Community Innovation Survey takes place every 4 
years in European countries and it aims at collecting information on firms’ innovation 
activities. The fourth CIS wave took place in 2005 and it follows the recommendations 
of the OSLO Manual on conducting innovation surveys (see OECD and EUROSTAT, 
1997). Each country implements the survey under the auspices of EUROSTAT.  
There are at least three key advantages in using data from the CIS surveys. First, 
they provide different measures of innovation from those previously used in the 
literature. Second, the data are internationally comparable given that the definitions of 
variables and the methodology employed in collecting the data are consistent across 
countries. Third, much of CIS surveys’ innovative indicators are based on subjective 
perceptions of respondents, which means that they are less affected by measurement 
errors (Mairesse and Mohnen, 2010). 
Our sample is restricted to manufacturing industry and, on account of data 
availability, includes the following countries: Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Greece, 
France, Italy, Portugal, The Netherlands, Spain, and Sweden. Since our main interest is 
analyzing the relationship between institutional context and innovation intensity at 
industry level, from the CIS4 we collected data on employment, R&D expenses, and 
the number of firms that actually introduced innovations, either product or process 
innovation, in 2004 and for 2-digit level NACE classification of industries. Detailed 
information on the survey questions used in the analysis can be found in the 
Appendix. 
This data was then combined with data on countries’ institutional environment, 
which were collected from various sources, namely the Doing Business Database from 
the World Bank, the OECD Indicators of Product Market Regulation Database and the 
Park (2008) indicator for IPRs.  
Both the World Bank and the OECD have produced several indicators designed to 
measure the institutional and regulatory environments of countries that in some cases 
are equivalent. The choice of each indicator was determined by both its content and 
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data availability, thus whenever possible we selected indicators which did not overlap 
in terms of content. In particular, we employed synthetic indicators of regulatory 
stringency in the product and labor markets, of patent rights protection strength, and 
an indicator of the level of development of capital markets.  
We supplemented our data with patent and R&D data from EUROSTAT and gross 
domestic production (GDP) and population data from OECD Statistics.  
Empirical model and variables 
In order to investigate the effect of country-level variation in institutions on innovation 
intensity in Europe we rely on a cross-section of twenty-two 2-digit manufacturing 
industries in ten countries of the EU. In this way we control for industrial 
heterogeneity in a context where technologies are relatively homogenous while there is 
still variation among institutional regimes at the country level. Our reduced form 
model of industry innovation intensity is thus specified by: 
( ) ijjijjij egInnov +++= γαβ ηµINST  (1) 
where Innovij is the proportion of innovating firms in industry i of country j, jINST is a 
vector of indicators of country-level institutions that vary across countries, ijµ  is a 
vector of industry-specific variables that vary across industries and countries, jη  is a 
vector of country-specific characteristics and eij is a disturbance term capturing 
unobservable variables affecting innovation activities. β, α, and γ are the conformable 
vectors of unknown parameters. The parameters of interest are the β  coefficients on 
the institutional indicators.  
Dependent variable. We measure innovation intensity as the share of firms that reported 
having actually introduced an innovation in the market, over the last three previous 
years, in the total number of firms in a given industry. We focus on innovation intensity 
at the industry level. As such, we do not make a distinction between innovation and 
imitation. In fact, imitation is an economic activity much the same as innovation, since 
it requires resources and it responds to economic incentives (Helpman, 1993). 
Our measure of innovation is based on innovative output. It has the limitation of 
treating a firm as non-innovative in the case it answered negatively the question about 
the introduction of an innovation in the market, even though it had pursued R&D. 
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That is, the dependent variable is the ratio of firms introduced an innovation in the 
market over the total number of firms in the industry, independently of pursuing R&D 
activity. Thus, we focus on firm’s innovative output rather than its R&D effort. 
Similarly, more traditional indicators of innovation activity, such as R&D expenses 
or patents, have also well-known limitations. R&D measures only an input in the 
innovation process, although it is a major one, and only captures formal R&D activities. 
Thus, they may not capture small firms’ innovation activity where innovation often 
occurs without the performance of formal R&D, therefore incurring the risk of 
underestimating their innovation effort. In fact, it has been documented that in some 
European countries small firms’ non-formal R&D activities account for an important 
share in the total of innovative activities (Griffith et al. 2006b; Hall et al., 2008).  
Likewise patents only cover innovations that are sufficiently new and deemed 
worth to be patented by the patent applicant, and that may never be introduced on the 
market. Furthermore, small firms may also find it especially difficult to commercialize 
their intellectual property, either because they are unaware of the IPR system or 
because of the disproportionately high costs for such firms (Siegel and Wright, 2007). 
Finally, patenting propensity is highly specific to the industry (Hall, 2007; Mairesse 
and Mohen, 2010). 
Institutional variables. Institutions may shape the dynamics of innovation through 
various channels. One way in which the quality of prevailing economic, political and 
legal institutions leads to higher rates of innovation is by promoting entrepreneurial 
effort into productive activities and competition.  
As indicator of product market regulation we include PMR, a summary index of 
economic and administrative regulation that captures aspects of inward and outward-
oriented economic regulation and administrative barriers to start-ups, features of the 
licensing and permit system, and the communication and simplification of rules and 
procedures. This indicator summarizes a large set of formal rules and regulations that 
have the potential to reduce intensity of competition on a scale from 0 to 6 (from least 
to most restrictive).  
Labor market regulation is measured by the indicator Employment, an employment 
rigidity index that represents the difficulty which firms encounter in adapting to the 
labor force. This index deals with three broad areas of labor regulation - employment 
laws, collective relations laws, and social security laws. The index measures the 
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strength of protective measures against alternative employment contracts, the cost of 
increasing working hours, the economic cost of dismissing workers, and restrictions on 
employers for dismissing workers, either individually or collectively. Higher values 
correspond to greater legal protection of workers.  
With respect to the efficiency of the legal and judicial system in resolving legal 
disputes there are indicators that measure the extent to which agents trust in the rule of 
law and, in particular, the quality of contract enforcement, the protection of property 
rights, the police, and the courts. They are, nonetheless, generic indicators for legal 
protection. A more specific indicator of legal protection of innovation is the index of 
patent protection proposed by Ginarte and Park (1997) and updated by Park (2008), 
which measures the strength of patent laws and patent rights protection. We use this 
indicator to proxy the institutional context related with intellectual property rights – 
IPRs. 
Our indicator of capital markets’ regulation is Credit, which is an index of the 
development of capital markets. The credit index includes rules affecting the scope, 
accessibility, and quality of credit information available through either public or 
private credit registries. The index ranges from 0 to 6, with higher values indicating the 
greater availability of credit (from either a public registry or a private bureau) to 
facilitate lending decisions.  
Control Variables. We also include control variables in the regression. At the country-
level, the variable GDP measures gross domestic product per capita. We expect a 
positive impact of this variable on innovation by providing firms with a larger market 
and better infrastructure. At the industry-level, we include Size, measured by the 
industry (log) total turnover in 2002. Industry-specific capabilities in terms of 
innovation may also depend on the level of investment in R&D and the intensity of 
patenting. The variable R&D in the industry i of country j is the total expenditure in 
R&D, while the variable Patent in the industry i of country j is the ratio of number of 
patents in industry i to total number of patens in the manufacturing industry of 
country j. Finally, we include industry dummies in order to control for differences in 
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technological regimes. We use Pavitt's (1984) taxonomy7 to classify industries. 
According to this taxonomy, four types of industries are identified: scale-intensive, 
science-based, specialized suppliers and supplier dominated. The main limitation of 
this taxonomy, as with any other taxonomy, is the fact that these boundaries are not 
always straightforward. Nevertheless, it still is a valuable yardstick in helping us to 
describe the differences in technological regimes across industries. 
Table 1 lists the definition of each variable used in the empirical analysis, the exact 
source and time period, and the expected impact on innovation intensity at industry 
level according to the prior discussion in Section 2. 
Insert Table 1 here 
Some descriptive statistics of the dependent variable, institutional variables and 
control variables are reported in Table 2. Part I of the table reports some summary 
statistics, whereas Part II reports correlation coefficients among selected variables. 
Overall, European industries are quite intensive in innovation, as measured by the 
proportion of innovative firms, having a mean of 51% innovating firms. The data also 
show that differences in innovation intensity are quite significant with the proportion 
of innovating firms varying between 0.18 and 1. Another interesting feature is that 
European countries exhibit greater variation in their R&D expenditures than in their 
GDP per capita.  
Insert Table 2 here 
The data also shows that, although over the last two decades there has been some 
convergence in the EU's regulatory environment as a result of the Single Market 
Program and the Lisbon Agenda, there still is some variation with respect to 
institutions across EU countries. In particular, EU countries seem to differ most in the 
credit regulation, followed by the intellectual property regulation and then the product 
market regulation. This evidence is in line with Nicolleti and Scarpeta (2003), who 
provide evidence that large differences in regulatory patterns within Europe still 
subsist. 
                                                     
7 This taxonomy classified firms, according to their principal activity, based on the sources of 
technology, the nature of users’ needs, and means of appropriation, which then allows for a 
industry-level classification. 
  
18
The correlation coefficients show that GDP per capita has a negative correlation 
with heavier regulatory environments, namely in the product market (PMR) and labor 
markets (Employment), and has a positive correlation with patent protection strength 
(IPRs) and capital market development (Credit) indicators. Also, this correlation is 
stronger in former than in the latter. More interestingly, the correlation coefficients 
among institutional variables are sufficiently low to not raise concerns about potential 
multicolinearity problems. 
4. Econometric model and results 
Econometric model 
The nature of the dependent variable, the proportion of innovating firms in industry i 
of country j, suggests the use of the econometric method proposed by Papke and 
Wooldridge (1996). Their main assumption applied to (1) will be that, for all i and j  
( ) ( )γαβ jijjjijjij GE ηµINSTηµINST ++=,,|Innov  (2) 
where G(.) is a known cumulative distribution satisfying 0<G(z)<1 for all z ∈ R. This 
ensures that the predicted values of the proportion of innovating firms in industry i of 
country j lay in the interval (0,1). The two most common choices for G(.) are the logistic 
distribution and the standard normal cumulative function.  
Based on Gourieroux et al. (1984) and McCullagh and Nelder (1989), Papke and 
Wooldridge (1996) propose to estimate the unknown parameters by a quasi-likelihood 
method, which only requires the validity of the mean function, see equation (2), and 
the choice of a cumulative distribution that is a member of the linear exponential 
family, irrespective of whether it is or not the true distribution. If these two conditions 
hold, then the quasi-maximum likelihood estimator (QMLE) of β, α, and γ provide 
consistent estimates of the unknown parameters, given that the QMLE provides robust 
estimators of the conditional mean parameters with satisfactory efficiency properties 
(Papke and Wooldridge, 1996). 
However, the dependent variable, Innovij, can be considered a special case as it is a 
proportion of a count variable – the number of innovating firms - in a group of a 
known size – the total number of observed firms. The Papke-Wooldrigde method does 
not take directly into account the information on group size. Although they have 
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argued that, under the imposed assumptions, “the method … need not be less efficient 
than methods that used information on group size” (p. 621), we can use an alternative 
estimator that takes into account the nature of the dependent variable and allows us to 
control for group size.  
One alternative would be to apply the QMLE Poisson estimator, using group size 
as the exposure control. Similarly to the Papke-Wooldridge estimator, the QMLE 
Poisson estimator only requires the validity of the conditional mean function to 
provide robust estimates of parameters with satisfactory efficiency properties. The 
advantage of this alternative approach is that it incorporates information on group 
size, which allows us to discriminate between equal values of the proportion of 
innovating firms. It maintains the computational simplicity of the Papke-Wooldridge 
method and their estimates can be interpreted in a similar fashion.  
However, the Poisson estimator is mostly used to model rare events, in which the 
response variable is often small integers including zero. In cases where the response 
variable attains large means, as it is the case of the number of innovating firms, the 
Poisson distribution may fail to correctly predict large counts. In this case, it may well 
be approximated by the normal distribution, which implies that the conditional mean 
of the number of innovating firms could be estimated through a linear function of 
regressors.  
A similar approximation is suitable for dependent variables that are a proportion. 
However, when the dependent variable comes from binary data summarized as 
proportions, the specification of G(.) –see equation (2) - as a normal distribution 
violates the homogeneity of the variance assumption across industries required for the 
validity of statistical tests. One way to cope with this violation is to transform the 
dependent variable. For an analysis of binary data summarized as proportions, the 
arcsine-root transformation is used commonly based on a variance-stabilizing 
argument for binary data. Therefore, the conditional mean can be estimated by 
weighted least squares (WLS) applied to the transformed variable, using group size - 
the total number of observed firms - as a weight in order to make proportions closer to 
normal distribution with equal variance. 
In the next section these alternative econometric approaches are considered to 
ascertain the estimates' sensibility and to perform an empirically-oriented model 
selection.  
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Results 
To begin the empirical analysis, we carry out a sensitivity analysis in order to evaluate 
whether the magnitude and sign of estimates significantly change across alternative 
econometric approaches. We compare estimates among the four alternative 
econometric models discussed above: (i) a model of the ratio of innovating firms as a 
linear function of regressors; (ii) a model of the arcsine transformation of the ratio of 
innovating firms as a linear function of regressors, weighted by group size; (iii) a 
QMLE Poisson estimator applied to the number of innovating firms, using group size 
as the exposure control; and (iv) a QMLE Fractional Logit applied to the ratio of 
innovating firms. Table 3 shows the estimates for those alternative econometric 
approaches along with specification tests and goodness-of-fit in order to choose the 
best alternative. 
Insert Table 3 here 
The model estimated by OLS (see estimates in the first column of Table 3) can be 
considered a benchmark model, in which the standard normal cumulative function is 
assumed for G(.) in equation 2. Interestingly, it passes the robust RESET test8, leading 
to the no rejection of the null hypothesis under which the mean of the ratio of 
innovating firms is a linear function of the regressors. This may well be explained by 
the descriptive statistics of the dependent variable, which resemble quite well a normal 
distribution in terms of skewness and kurtosis. The OLS procedure, however, does not 
guarantee that the predicted values will be in the unit interval. Moreover, given the 
fact that the dependent variable comes from binary data summarized as proportions, it 
violates the homogeneity of the variance assumption across industries required for the 
validity of statistical tests.  
The robust RESET test applied to the other econometric specifications also 
indicates no misspecification problem in none of them. This suggest that the choice for 
G(.) – see equation 2 – is quite flexible given the statistical characteristics of the 
dependent variable. Moreover, as in Table 3 all choice of G(.) are members of the linear 
                                                     
8 The robust RESET test is based on the regression of the OLS residuals on the defined set of 
regressors and polynomials of the OLS fitted values. The test statistics is NR2 ∼χ2(p), where p is 
the number of polynomials of the OLS fitted values. 
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exponential family, the coefficients estimates are consistent, irrespective of whether it is 
or not the true distribution, provided that the correct specification of the conditional 
mean. 
Looking at coefficient estimates9, all the alternative approaches yield qualitatively 
similar results. In particular, the effects of institutional variables on the ratio of 
innovative firms are roughly unchanged in terms of size, sign, and statistical 
significance. It appears that they provide an accurate representation of the effects of 
institutional environment on the ratio of innovative firms throughout the entire 
distribution of each institutional variable. 
Based on the gathered evidence, all alternative approaches could be considered 
valid econometric strategies in estimating the effects of institutional environment on 
the conditional mean of the fractional response. Despite of that they exhibit unequal 
goodness-of-fit based on the predicted mean of the fractional response and on the R2 
statistic.  
The Poisson specification largely fails to correctly predict the mean of the 
dependent variable. The long right tail of the number of innovating firms appears to 
affect negatively the Poisson goodness-of-fit. In fact, the underestimate of the mean of 
the ratio of innovative firms suggests that the Poisson specification fails to correctly 
predict large counts and, hence, the fractional variable. Conversely, the QMLE 
Fractional Logit model and the WLS-Arcsine model seem to perform better than the 
QMLE Poisson.  
It is interestingly to note that the OLS and QMLE Fractional Logit specification are 
similar in terms of goodness-of-fit, reinforcing the finding that statistical proprieties of 
the dependent variable allow a quite flexible choice of the cumulative distribution. 
However, using the R2 - a measure of the predictive power of the models - the 
econometric approaches that take into account information on group size (the QMLE 
Poisson and the WLS-Arcsine) show better performance than the other approaches.  
                                                     
9 The coefficient estimates from the nonlinear QMLE Poisson and QMLE Fractional Logit 
models are not directly compared with the OLS and WLS-Arcsine estimates, as the first are 
nonlinear functions of the coefficient estimates and the levels of regressors. The comparison 
needs to be done with the marginal effects estimates, which measures changes in the ratio of 
innovative firms associated with changes in the regressors. 
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Based on these results and in order to benefit from a number of state-of-the-art 
techniques for the estimation and testing of regression models with endogenous 
variables, we choose the WLS-Arcsine econometric specification to go on with 
empirical analysis.  
In all regressions the institutional indicators are lagged one year to reflect the 
premise that institutions are predetermined. Given the cross-sectional nature of the 
model and, hence, of the estimates we can argue that institutions are, at least, partially 
predetermined as they tend to be much more erratically and slowly changing than 
firms’ innovative behavior (Nelson, 2008). At the firm level, innovation is driven by 
individual preferences and the endowment of resources, which may change with each 
period that firms operate in the market. On the other hand, the dynamics of 
institutional change are strongly dependent on the assessment of existing institutions, 
which is a difficult task because of the uncertainty concerning their effectiveness. 
Therefore, in terms of institutional choices, “mistakes can be made, and can last a long 
time” (Nelson, 2008: p. 10). 
However, the validity of such premise needs to be empirically evaluated. In fact, 
there may be underlying variables driving innovative activity in an industry/country 
and, simultaneously, determining the institutional environment in that country. If so, 
the relationship between innovation and institutional environment may be the result of 
these omitted variables and it would be not possible to identify a causal relationship.  
Moreover, the institutional environment itself (and regulation in particular) may 
respond to industry specific technological opportunities, generating an endogeneity 
problem for institutional variables in models that do not control for such shocks. For 
example, Alesina et al. (2005) have addressed this in the context of technological 
change associated with cellular phones and wireless technology, showing that a new 
market structure in the telecommunications industry may have given impetus to 
deregulation. We tackle this problem by using instrumental variables (IV) techniques 
in order to test for the presence of endogenous variables, to evaluate the validity and 
strength of instruments and to estimate a causal relationship between institutional 
environment and innovation. 
The instruments need to be correlated with the institutional variables but 
uncorrelated with firms’ innovation behavior at industry/country level. Our 
instruments for institutions' quality reflect differences in historical circumstances with 
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respect to the legal environment and human capital, as well as differences in political 
institutions and regulatory framework. In particular, we use countries’ legal origins, 
literacy level, degree of judicial review, and intensity of transposition of European 
directives as instruments (see Table 4 for exact definition of instruments and source).  
Insert Table 4 here 
Following La Porta’s et al. (1998, 1999), several papers have shown that current 
regulatory environments correlate with each country’s legal tradition (see La Porta et 
al. (2008) for a literature review). For example, the laws of common law countries 
(originating in English law) tend to be more protective of outside investors than the 
laws of civil law countries (originating in Roman law), especially French civil law 
countries. Countries’ legal origins have been used as an instrument for contemporary 
institutional quality because since it occurred centuries ago is unlikely to be correlated 
with nowadays firms’ and individuals' behavior, and in our case with firms’ innovative 
behavior. Other historical variables that have been proposed as instruments for 
institutional quality today relate political institutions and human capital (Rodrik et al. 
2002; Acemoglu et al., 2002).  
The validity of political institutions as measures, however, has been criticized by 
Glaeser et al. (2004): these measures represent outcomes that are neither permanent nor 
durable characteristics of the political environment and political constraints on the 
executive. As such, we use the measures proposed by Glaeser et al. (2004) for political 
constraint, namely the rigidity of constitution and the degree of judicial review.  
On the other hand, Glaeser et al. (2004) found evidence that initial levels of human 
capital continue to be strong predictors of institutions' quality. Thus, we use the 
literacy level in 1880 as an instrument for institutions' quality. Finally, we use the 
intensity of transposition of European directives as an instrument for product market 
regulation, an approach that was also used by Griffith et al. (2007). 
Table 5 display some test statistics that allows us to discuss empirically the 
validity of the premise of predetermined institutions. In particular, we use these tests 
as pretests in order to choose between estimates. If the tests reject exogeneity of 
institutional variables, and hence do not validate the premise of predetermined 
institutions, then inference about the parameter of interest will be based on estimates 
obtained from an estimator that is consistent under endogeneity. Otherwise, estimates 
can be computed from an estimator that is consistent under exogeneity. 
  
24
Insert Table 5 here 
Inspection of the results displayed in Table 5 suggests that the premise of 
predetermined institutions is not valid for all variables that proxy institutions. When 
all institutional variables are jointly tested for exogeneity, the results suggest the 
presence of endogeneity. Moreover, the other diagnostic tests reject the null hypothesis 
of weak instruments, suggesting that the instruments are adequate to identify the first-
stage equation. 
Looking at each institutional variable, the diagnostic tests suggest that the 
presence of endogeneity is only empirically confirmed to the IPRs variable. In this case, 
the Hansen J statistic suggests that we cannot reject the over-identifying restrictions 
that the instruments can be excluded from the regression and, hence, it provides 
evidence on the validity of the instruments. Moreover, the other tests reinforce the 
evidence of strong instruments. Overall, the diagnostic tests suggest that the 
instruments we use affect the IPRs variable in a sensible way and confirm their power 
to circumvent the endogeneity problem. 
This finding is consistent with previous empirical evidence. In fact, the view that 
IPRs evolve over time and are driven by economic and political forces has been 
previously documented (North, 1990; Acemoglu, 2003; Kanwar, 2007; Eicher and 
Penalosa, 2008). 
Nonetheless, the failure to reject exogeneity should not be strictly interpreted as 
that the variable in question is exogenous. The test is important in its own right as may 
provides empirical confirmation for a-priori concerns about potential endogeneity. 
Given the theoretical concerns about endogeneity, we implement an estimation 
procedure that accounts for this and the diagnostic tests provide ex-post empirical 
evidence of these concerns not having been justified for three of the institutional 
variables. Accordingly, the model was re-estimated with the IPRs variable being 
instrumented with the selected instruments. Table 6 display coefficients estimates 
along with standard errors. 
Insert Table 6 here 
Comparing the WLS and IV estimates, we can see that the IV estimates of interest 
are larger than the non-IV (WLS) estimates, suggesting that if there are unobserved 
variables driving innovative activity in an industry/country, they cause the non-IV 
estimates to understate the true effect of IPRs in innovation intensity. It is interesting to 
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note, however, that all IV estimates maintain the sign of non-IV estimates, indicating 
that the direction of institutional environment effects is not affected by an endogeneity 
problem.  
From Table 6 we can see that those institutions that have the largest effect on the 
intensity of innovative firms are intellectual property protection, IPRs, and labor 
market regulation, Employment, followed by product market regulation, PMR, and 
credit market development, Credit. 
The size and significance of the coefficient estimate of the variable IPRs illustrate 
the importance of property rights protection as an element of the institutional structure 
of an economy and in shaping innovation intensity (e.g. North, 1990; Acemoglu, 2003). 
Interestingly, whereas the negative sign of the associated coefficient is at odds with 
some previous evidence (e.g. Kanwar, 2007) it provides evidence supporting the 
arguments against the use of patents (e.g. Horwitz and Lai, 1996; Boldrin and Levine, 
2008; Hopenhayn et al., 2006).  
As such, this result seems to suggest the underlying following effects. First, 
patents are acting as barrier to the flow of knowledge and creation of new ideas across 
firms and industries. Second, the level of strength in the protection of property rights 
has attained the desired threshold beyond which increases in the strength of protection 
of IPRs does not lead to increases in innovation (Ginarte and Park, 1997; Qian, 2007; 
Eicher and Penalosa, 2008). Third, patenting costs are too costly. These costs relate the 
costs of obtaining the patent as well as enforcement costs (e.g. litigation expenses, 
monitoring for possible infringement, and the costs of establishing new case law to 
ensure legal protection for new innovations), which can be substantial (see Lanjouw 
and Schankerman, 2003) and particularly detrimental to small firms (Siegel and 
Wright, 2007). 
The interdependence between innovation and IPRs that is shown in the data can 
be the result of private decisions.  Eicher and Penalosa (2008) show that a lower degree 
of protection reduces the returns from research and hence the incentives to do R&D; 
similarly, a low level of R&D will reduce the return to investment in IPR protection. 
Though this argument predicts a positive relationship between investments in R&D 
and strengthening of IPR, it also indicates that the private cost of strengthening IPR 
protection is an important determinant of the returns to innovation. 
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The second most important institution that seems influencing innovation intensity 
in European industries is labor market regulation. Specifically, the magnitude of the 
coefficient of the variable Employment, a proxy for labor markets' rigidity implies that, 
ceteris paribus, the intensity of innovation at the industry level decreases around 0.54 
for a unit increase in the indicator of employment rigidity. This finding is consistent 
with the view that rigidities in the labor market regulation hinder innovation (e.g. 
Menezes-Filho et al., 1998; Gust and Marquez, 2004; Koeninger, 2005; Samaniego, 2006, 
2008; Alesina and Zeira, 2006).  
Furthermore, if one assumes that the mechanisms by which regulation influences 
innovation are related to productivity growth, investment and trade then this result is 
also consistent with the evidence that finds a negative impact of employment 
protection rigidity on productivity (Forteza and Rama, 2006; Kılıçaslan and Taymaz, 
2008, Bassanini et al., 2009; Poschke, 2009), on investment (Cingano et al., 2010) and on 
trade (Kambourov, 2009) in EU countries. 
In turn, the estimates of the variable PMR, a proxy for product market regulation, 
indicate that heavier regulation has a negative effect on innovation, specifically 
innovation intensity decreases by 0.16 for a unit increase in the indicator PMR. This 
result is overall consistent with the evidence of Griffith et al. (2006a) regarding the EU 
market but at odds with the findings of Amable et al. (2010) regarding a set of OECD 
countries. As in the case of Employment, if one assumes that the mechanisms by which 
regulation influences innovation are related to productivity growth then the evidence 
emerging from our data is consistent with a growing number of studies that found a 
negative impact of heavy product market regulation on productivity (Conway et al., 
2005; Aghion et al., 2005; Bourlès et al., 2010). 
A study related to ours is that by Amable et al. (2010). Although a direct 
comparison of our findings with theirs is not straightforward, given the differences in 
the sample, model and dependent variable, it is useful to establish a link between their 
results and ours. Whereas our results suggest an overall negative association across 
industries, particularly in the more R&D intensive industries and in line with most 
studies (e.g. Aghion et al., 2005), Amable et al. (2010) found a positive association 
between regulation and innovation in industries close to the technological frontier and 
a negative association between regulation and innovation in industries distant to the 
frontier. 
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The difference between results may to some extent be explained by differences in 
the dependent variable as Amable et al. (2010) use patents as indicator of innovation. A 
similar explanation could be underlying the differences between this study and others 
(Amable et al., 2010; Griffith and Macartney, 2010) regarding the relationship between 
employment protection regulation and innovation. Though the differences in the 
sample and methodology between studies do not allow us to draw a conclusion, at 
least it suggests the relevance of employing different indicators of innovation when 
assessing its drivers.  
The coefficient estimates associated with the variable Credit illustrate that financial 
development, namely through increases in information sharing and credit access, are 
fostering innovation thereby confirming previous evidence (Carpenter and Petersen, 
2002; Botazzi and Rin, 2002). Specifically, results suggest that innovation intensity 
increases around 0.04 for a unit increase in the indicator Credit across European 
industries. 
Few studies have investigated the impact of credit market regulation on 
innovation.  In this sense our results can be directly compared to those by Griffith and 
Macartney (2010) who also found a positive correlation between the indicator of credit 
market regulation and innovation. Our results are also related to the literature that 
found evidence showing a positive impact of financial development on firm survival 
and economic success (Clementi and Hopenhayn, 2006; Guiso et al., 2004). 
Regarding the control variables their estimates reveal that the most important 
drivers of differences in innovation intensity across European industries are the 
country’s wealth, measured by the GDP per capita variable, and differences in 
technological regimes and opportunities across industries, as proxied by the Pavitt’s 
taxonomy variables. These results are in line with the view that emphasizes the 
importance of industry-specific characteristics for the development and diffusion of 
new technologies (e.g. Breschi et al., 2000; Fagerberg, 2002; Samaniego, 2006; Ngai and 
Samaniego, 2010). 
Moreover, these results raise the question whether the effects of institutions on 
innovation may vary across different types of industries. To test for it, we interact the 
country-level institutional factors with the industry dummies and let the data tell us 
how the institutions’ interaction with industry characteristics influences innovation. 
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Table 7 shows the estimates, along with standard errors, of the interplay between 
institutions and type of industries. 
Insert Table 7 here 
The estimates indicate there are differences on the size of the impact of regulation 
across industries. Specifically the size of the negative impact is larger on the Science 
based industries than in the other industries indicating that these industries are being 
negatively affected by the lack of competition. The Science based industries are 
technology-intensive industries and, according to Aghion et al. (2005), one should 
expect a negative impact of a decrease in competition on innovation activity in these 
industries. In fact, Aghion et al. (2005) have proposed that less competition could 
possibly boost innovation in laggard industries, but would hinder it in leading 
industries, i.e., close to the technological frontier. The possibility of both effects has 
been proposed by other contributions (e.g. Boone, 2001; Dubey and Wu, 2002; 
Dinlersoz and MacDonald, 2009) while others have argued that firms’ incentives to 
innovation depend not only on the competitive environment in which they operate but 
also on the underlying technology and technological regime of the industry (Breschi et 
al., 2000; Fagerberg, 2002; Samaniego, 2006; Ngai and Samaniego, 2010). 
Furthermore, it should be noted that estimates of Table 7 reveal a consistent 
negative association (though not always statistically significant), across industries with 
different technological regimes, between the interactive term and innovation intensity. 
Thus the evidence seems to favor the argument of innovation-boosting effect of 
competition. Yet we should be cautious and not to interpret this result as evidence 
against the Schumpeterian effects argument. First and foremost, the PMR indicator 
comprehends other dimensions than the level of competition in the markets, namely 
the level of bureaucracy, which acts as important barriers to the easy of doing business.  
It has been argued that the impact of employment protection regulation may have 
different effects on innovation across industries (Bassanini and Ernst, 2002). We find 
that labor market regulation – Employment – impact differently across industries, with 
the Specialized suppliers industries being those where the effects of strict employment 
regulation on innovation intensity are negative and statistically dissimilar from the 
other types of industries. 
This could be due to the lack of skills required to implement innovations within 
the firm, which makes the adjustment cost imposed by hiring and firing restrictions to 
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be high (Bassanini and Ernst, 2002). Another reason why the negative effect of strict 
employment regulation is more pronounced in these industries is that these adjustment 
costs may be exacerbated due to negative externalities coming from adjustments in the 
labor markets of their downstream industries (e.g. textiles, apparel, specialized 
components). 
Our results highlight a negative effect of employment protection stringency on 
innovation. Nonetheless, the fact that the impact of employment rigidity on innovation 
intensity is more pronounced in these industries indicates that there are inter-industry 
differences to the same labor laws.  
Although well-developed credit markets are expected to favor innovation overall, 
there might be differences of its impact across industries. Specifically, access to credit 
can be more critical in high-technology industries, which typically have higher external 
financing needs (Dabla-Norris et al., 2010). As shown in Table 7 credit market 
regulation has always a positive impact on innovation intensity across industries, 
being its effect more pronounced in the Scale intensive industries, which are among the 
most technology-intensive. 
Also the protection of property rights is expected to be more important in 
industries in which the main appropriation strategy is through patents (e.g. 
pharmaceuticals, instruments) versus an appropriation strategy based on secrecy, more 
common in process innovations. Yet the estimates of the interaction terms between 
IPRs and industries do not reveal differences of their impact on innovation intensity at 
industry level.  
5. Conclusions 
In this paper we empirically investigated the role of institutional variation in 
explaining differences in innovation intensity across European industries. Our focus 
was on a set of regulatory practices and policies that are aimed at regulating product, 
labor and capital markets, as well as the strength of intellectual property rights. 
As theoretical contributions do not provide a clear cut prediction on the 
relationship between these institutions and innovation, ultimately the answer has to 
come from the data. Yet existing empirical evidence is still relatively scarce and 
inconclusive. Therefore this paper contributes to the literature by supplementing 
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previous evidence using the proportion of innovating firms in EU manufacturing 
industries as a proxy for innovation. 
Our results highlight the importance of institutions in explaining differences in the 
intensity of innovation in manufacturing industries of EU countries and are largely 
consistent with most theoretical and empirical contributions. 
Regarding product and labor market regulation we found an unambiguous 
negative association between regulation and innovation, which validates the 
propositions of the Lisbon Agenda towards deregulation of these markets as a means 
to promote innovation and growth. However, one should note that in some cases 
product market regulation may be instrumental in pushing firms to efficiency and 
innovation, such as regulation on quality standards and on energy efficiency and 
development. The product market regulation indicator employed in this paper 
measures a set of both administrative and economic policies and practices that are 
detrimental to the ease of doing business, so in this case regulation is expected to be a 
barrier and not a driver of innovation. As such, first and foremost our findings should 
be interpreted as corroborating this view. 
A particularly interesting finding of this paper with policy implications is the 
negative association between intellectual property protection and innovation intensity 
at industry level. It appears that intellectual property protection is hindering 
innovation across EU industries. As such one key message that stands out is how one 
should be cautious in thinking about property rights extension in a monolithic way.  
The empirical findings also point out the relevance of industry-specific effects and 
their interactions with institutions in order to deeper understand how institutions 
influence innovation. As such, one interesting extension of this research would be to 
investigate the mechanisms through which institutions shape innovation in specific 
type of industries. This would require a longitudinal study of a specific type of 
industries and a focus on one institution. Ideally the selected institution would be gone 
through a truly exogenous shift or a natural experiment could be found and exploited 
in order to eliminate any potential endogeneity problem. Another potentially fruitful 
extension would be to improve our understanding on the way exogenous changes in 
institutions may foster innovation activity at firm-level. While our study is set at the 
industry level, it would be interesting to complement it with studies at other levels, 
notably the firm level.  We plan to address these issues in future research. 
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Table 1 Variables acronym, description and expected impact on innovation 
Variable Description 
Expected 
Impact 
Innov Dependent variable: proportion of innovative enterprises in industry 
i, of country j. 2-digit level of NACE classification, 2004. Source: CIS4, 
EUROSTAT.   
 
PMR Product market regulation index, measuring economic and 
administrative formal rules and regulations that have potential to 
block competition; values vary between 0 and 6 from least to most 
restrictive competition, 2003. Source: Product Market Regulation 
Indicators Database, OECD.10 
+/- 
Employment Rigidity of employment index, measuring the difficulty of employers 
to hiring and firing. Higher values of the index mean more protection, 
2003. Source: Doing Business Database, The World Bank Group.11 
 
+/- 
Credit Credit information index measures rules affecting the scope, 
accessibility and quality of credit information available through either 
public or private credit registries. The index ranges from 0 to 6, with 
higher values indicating the availability of more credit information, 
2003. Source: Doing Business Database, The World Bank Group. 
+ 
IPRs Indicator of the strength of patent protection. Source: Park(2008) +/- 
GDP  Logarithm of gross domestic product per capita, constant prices 
average 2001-2003. Source: National Accounts Database, OECD. 
+ 
Patent The ratio of number of patents in industry i of country j to total 
number of patents in manufacturing industry of country j. Source: 
EUROSTAT 
+ 
R&D Logarithm of total expenditure in R&D on industry i, country j, 2004. 
Source: CIS4, EUROSTAT. 
+ 
Size Logarithm of total turnover in industry i, 2002. Source: CIS4, 
EUROSTAT. 
+ 
 
                                                     
10 See Conway et al. (2005) for detailed description on the construction of the PMR indicator. 
11 See Botero et al. (2004) for detailed description on the construction of the Employment 
indicator. 
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Table 2 Descriptive statistics of dependent and explanatory variables 
Variable Min. Max. Mean Std. Dev. 
Part I Summary statistics 
Innov 0.182 1 0.513 0.180 
PMR 1.1 1.9 1.557 0.203 
Employment 0.1 0.56 0.464 0.101 
Credit 3 6 4.634 1.076 
IPRs 3.97 4.67 4.425 0.271 
GDP per capita 2.407 3.406 2.943 0.295 
Patent 0.0004 6.531 0.171 0.759 
R&D 2.959 7.398 5.313 0.779 
Size 1.607 3.509 0.180 0.257 
Scale intensive 0 1 0.379 0.487 
Science based 0 1 0.124 0.331 
Specialized suppliers 0 1 0.199 0.400 
 
Part II Correlation coefficients among selected variables 
 GDP PMR Employment Credit IPRs 
GDP 1.000     
PMR -0.552 1.000    
Employment -0.588 0.530 1.000   
Credit 0.125 -0.052 -0.059 1.000  
IPRs 0.859 -0.322 -0.569 0.355 1.000 
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Table 3 Alternative estimates for the relationship between innovation and 
institutions along with standard deviations 
 OLS WLS-
Arcsine 
QMLE-Poisson QMLE-Fractional 
Logit 
Variables Estimates Estimates Estimates Marginal 
effects 
Estimates Marginal 
effects 
PMR -0.159** 
(0.062) 
-0.196* 
(0.097) 
-0.354* 
(0.195) 
-0.160* 
(0.090) 
-0.675*** 
(0.261) 
-0.168*** 
(0.065) 
Employment -0.361* 
(0.184) 
-0.506** 
(0.181) 
-1.025*** 
(0.361) 
-0.463*** 
(0.167) 
-1.530** 
(0.761) 
-0.382** 
(0.190) 
Credit 0.025 
(0.024) 
0.042** 
(0.018) 
0.082** 
(0.037) 
0.037** 
(0.017) 
0.108 
(0.100) 
0.027 
(0.025) 
IPRs  -0.504** 
(0.170) 
-0.672*** 
(0.149) 
-1.204*** 
(0.279) 
-0.544** 
(0.129) 
-2.149*** 
(0.747) 
-0.537 *** 
(0.186) 
GDP per capita 0.352** 
(0.132) 
0.547** 
(0.182) 
0.971*** 
(0.352) 
0.439*** 
(0.161) 
1.496*** 
(0.571) 
0.373*** 
(0.142) 
Patents -0.028*** 
(0.009) 
-0.032*** 
(0.009) 
-0.042*** 
(0.015) 
-0.018** 
(0.007) 
-0.125*** 
(0.044) 
-0.031*** 
(0.011) 
Size 0.198** 
(0.069) 
-0.003 
(0.048) 
0.037 
(0.097) 
0.017 
(0.044) 
0.827*** 
(0.286) 
0.207*** 
(0.071) 
R&D 0.026 
(0.035) 
0.082* 
(0.042) 
0.127* 
(0.069) 
0.057* 
(0.030) 
0.121 
(0.151) 
0.030 
(0.038) 
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 161 161 161 161 
(Pseudo) R2 0.491 0.785 0.709 0.490 
Robust RESET 0.08 [0.96] 3.27 
[0.195] 
0.782 [0.676] 0.528 [0.767] 
Predicted mean of 
innov 
0.513 0.545 0.452 0.516 
Observed mean of 
innov 
0.513 
Notes: Dependent variable: innov - ratio of innovative firms to total number of firms of industry 
i, country j, 2004. Manufacturing industries are identified at 2-digit level of NACE classification. 
All regressions include intercept. Clustered by country standard errors are in parentheses. 
Based on them ***, **, * mean coefficients statistically significant at 1%, 5%, and 10% level, 
respectively. p-values are in square brackets. In the case of QMLE Fractional-logit model, the R2 
is a summary measure of the predictive power of the model. It is the square of the correlation 
between the dependent variable and its predicted values. See Table 2 for the exact definition of 
the variables 
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Table 4 Instrument acronyms, description and statistical source 
Variable Description Source 
Legor_fr Dummy variable that identifies the legal origin of 
each country, equals 1 if French and 0 otherwise. 
La Porta et al. (1999) 
Jud_rev Judicial review measures the extent to which 
judges (either supreme court or constitutional 
court) have the power to review the 
constitutionality of laws in a given country. The 
variable takes three values: 2 if there is full review 
of the constitutionality of laws, 1 if there is limited 
review of the constitutionality of laws, and 0 if 
there is no review of the constitutionality of laws. 
Glaeser et al. (2004) 
Liter_1880pc Literacy in 1880 is the percentage of enrollment of 
primary-school students of ages 5-14. 
Lindert (2009) available at 
http://www.econ.ucdavis.
edu/faculty/fzlinder/ 
EU-trans Transposition deficit is the percentage of internal 
market directives not yet communicated as 
having been transposed, average value 1997-2003. 
Internal market scoreboard 
available at 
http://europa.eu.int/com
m/internal_market/score/
index_en.htm. 
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Table 5 Test for endogeneity of each institutional variable and strength of 
instruments (IV) 
Variable Endogeneity 
test 
[H0: the variable is 
exogenous] 
Hansen J test 
[H0: instruments 
are valid] 
Anderson 
canonical 
correlations LR test 
[H0: first-stage equation 
is underidentified] 
First-stage F-
statistic 
[H0: weak 
instruments] 
All (PMR, 
Employment, 
Credit, IPRs) 
27.368 (0.000) 0.000 (equation 
exactly 
identified) 
51.888 (0.000) - 
PMR 0.791 (0.374) 33.025 (0.000) 426.567 (0.000) 73.92 (0.000) 
Employment 0.411 (0.522) 27.988 (0.000) 380.727 (0.000) 64.01 (0.000) 
Credit 0.838 (0.360) 33.452 (0.000) 201.183 (0.000) 28.38 (0.000) 
IPRs 16.729 (0.000) 6.394 (0.094) 305.256 (0.000) 138.23 (0.000) 
Notes: For all test the p-values are in parenthesis. See Table 2 for the exact definition of the 
variables and Table 4 for the exact definition of the instruments. 
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Table 6 Instrumental variables estimates for the relationship between institutions 
and innovation 
 Arcsine transformation 
Variables WLS IV 
PMR -0.196* (0.097) -0.159* (0.071) 
Employment -0.506** (0.181) -0.536** (0.117) 
IPRs  -0.672*** (0.149) -0.708*** (0.128) 
Credit 0.042** (0.018) 0.042**** (0.014) 
GDP per capita 0.547** (0.182) 0.571*** (0.130) 
Patents -0.032*** (0.009) -0.029 (0.007) 
Size -0.003 (0.048) 0.004 (0.057) 
R&D 0.082* (0.042) 0.079 (0.029) 
Scale intensive industries -0.015 (0.019) -0.014 (0.022) 
Science based industries 0.202*** (0.038) 0.201*** (0.052) 
Specialized suppliers industries 0.107*** (0.032) 0.108*** (0.027) 
Observations 161 161 
R2 0.785 0.784 
Notes: Dependent variable: innov - ratio of innovative firms to total number of firms of industry 
i, country j, 2004. Manufacturing industries are identified at 2-digit level of NACE classification. 
All regressions include intercept but estimates of the intercept are not reported. Robust 
standard errors are in parentheses. Based on them ***, **, * mean coefficients statistically 
significant at 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. See Table 2 for the exact definition of the 
variables and Table 4 for the exact definition of the instruments. 
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Table 7 Estimates of the interplay between institutions and type of industries 
 Baseline 
coefficients 
Interactions coefficients 
Scale intensive 
industries 
Science based 
industries 
Specialized 
suppliers 
industries 
PMR 0.358 (0.247) -0.166 (0.182) -0.446* (0.233) -0.117 (0.179) 
Employment 0.140 (0.339) -0.587 (0.398) -0.508 (0.380) -0.620* (0.375) 
Credit 0.011 (0.035) 0.067* (0.035) 0.022 (0.039) 0.036 (0.036) 
IPRs  -1.287*** (0.306) -0.053 (0.171) 0.070 (0.222) -0.015 (0.180) 
Notes: Dependent variable: innov - ratio of innovative firms to total number of firms of industry 
i, country j, 2004. Manufacturing industries are identified at 2-digit level of NACE classification. 
All regressions include intercept and control variables but estimates are not reported for clarity 
purposes. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Based on them ***, **, * mean coefficients 
statistically significant at 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. See Table 2 for the exact definition 
of the variables and Table 4 for the exact definition of the instruments. 
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Appendix 
 
The Community Innovation Survey (CIS) is a survey conducted by EU member states 
under the auspices of EUROSTAT that allows the monitoring of Europe’s progress in 
the area of innovation. The survey was originally conducted every four years, but since 
2005 has been conducted every two. The survey includes sections on factors that 
hamper innovation, the impact of innovation on the business and the sources of 
information used. It also touches on aspects of the wider innovation process, such as 
the introduction of new management techniques. The CIS follows the OECD 
recommendations published in the Oslo Manual (OECD/Eurostat, 2005). Nowadays 
the CIS data has been widely used and the validity of its innovative indicators 
recognized by researchers (see, e.g., Kleinknecht et al., 2002; Mairesse and Mohnen, 
2010).  
The CIS data were collected from http://epp.EUROSTAT.ec.europa.eu/. 
Although the CIS data are at the firm-level, EUROSTAT only makes it available at 2-
digit level of NACE classification. Our dependent variable, i.e., the number of 
enterprises that introduced a product and/or process innovation refers to two 
questions in the survey. The questions include a definition of product innovation and 
process innovation: “A product innovation is the market introduction of a new good or 
service or a significantly improved good or service with respect to its capabilities, such 
as quality, user friendliness, software or subsystems. The innovation must be new to 
your enterprise, but it does not need to be new to your market. It does not matter if the 
innovation was originally developed by your enterprise or by other enterprises. During 
the three-year period 2002-2004, did your enterprise introduce: (1) new or significantly 
improved goods. (Exclude the simple resale of new goods purchased from other 
enterprises and changes of a purely cosmetic nature); (2) new or significantly improved 
services. Process innovation is the use of new or significantly improved methods for 
the production or supply of goods and services. The innovation must be new to your 
enterprise, but it does not need to be new to your industry. It does not matter if the 
innovation was originally developed by your enterprise or by other enterprises. Purely 
organizational or managerial changes should not be included. During the three-year 
period 2002-2004, did your enterprise introduce any new or significantly improved 
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processes for producing or supplying products (goods or services) which were new to 
your enterprise?”. Although the questionnaire has two different questions, EUROSTAT 
aggregates both. 
The R&D expenditures refer to the total expenditure made by the enterprise in 
2004: “Please estimate the amount of expenditure in each innovation activity in 2004, 
either from management accounting information or using informed estimates”. Table 
A.1 reports the specific EUROSTAT tables from which the data were collected. 
 
Table A.1 CIS4 data collected from EUROSTAT 
Variable Description Source 
Innoact Enterprises with innovation activities 2004 INN_CIS4_PROD = Product 
and process innovation 
REXP04 Total innovation expenditure in 2004 INN_CIS4_EXP = Innovation 
activity and expenditure 
Emp04 Total number of employees in 2004 INN_CIS4_BAS = Basic 
economic information on the 
enterprises 
Ent_popu04 Total number of enterprises in the 
population in 2004 
INN_CIS4_BAS = Basic 
economic information on the 
enterprises 
 
 
